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ABSTRACT
The economic future of Aboriginal Australians in the Northern Territory
will be significantly improved in the 21st century if strategic gains in land
ownership made in the late 20th century can be converted to economic
development of that land. In this paper, in a specific regional context, it is
argued that leverage provided by the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976, and now the Native Title Act 1993, has the capacity to
facilitate regional development options for Aboriginal people. The
potential for such a scenario is assessed by considering the economic
lessons that can be learnt from the operations of the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 over the past 17 years and the extent
that these have been, and can be, incorporated into die Native Title Act
1993. The paper begins by outlining the institutional and legislative history
of making mining payments to Aboriginal people for the use of their land.
It then moves to examine financial components of the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 and to evaluate the efficacy of their
operation. The paper ends by asking how economic lessons from the
Northern Territory might have been incorporated into the Native Title Act
1993 and examining two mining agreements completed in the post-Mabo
era. Policy issues that emanate from this analysis, especially in relation to
the implementing of native title, are raised in conclusion. This discussion
paper is a revised version of a paper presented at the Mabo and Native
Titles Seminar convened by the Macquarie University Mineral and Energy
Economics Centre and the Australian Mining and Petroleum Law
Association, ANA Hotel, The Rocks, Sydney, 14-15 April 1994.
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The economic future of Aboriginal Australians in the Northern Territory
will be significantly improved in the 21st century if strategic gains in land
ownership made in the late 20th century can be converted to economic
development of that land. Such economic development will occur
primarily through joint ventures with non-indigenous mining, tourism and
pastoral interests. Some Aboriginal people, especially those living at
outstations on Aboriginal-owned land, might continue to pursue tradition-
oriented lifestyles largely removed from the mainstream economy. But
others will seek either direct or indirect commercial options as a means to
bridge the current gulf in living standards between themselves and non-
indigenous Australians.
This paper examines the potential for such a scenario by considering the
economic lessons that can be learnt from the operations of the Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 over the past 17 years and the
extent that these have been and can be incorporated into the Native Title
Act 1993. The applicability of the Northern Territory case to the rest of
Australia can be called to question: nowhere else do indigenous people
constitute 23 per cent of the population; nowhere else, with the possible
exception of Western Australia, could they potentially own 49 per cent of a
State or Territory; and nowhere else have their land interests, admittedly
limited at first, been recognised in law for over eighty years. On the other
hand, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 has had
some important influences and has been used as a benchmark in
negotiating native title legislation in much the same way as it was used as a
benchmark to reject the Commonwealth's preferred national land rights
model in 1985; the major difference is that in 1993 the Aboriginal
leadership acquiesced to the absence of a veto right.
The focus here is on Aboriginal economic policy issues that is based on
research undertaken over the past ten years on the impact of mining
moneys on Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory.1 The paper begins
by outlining the institutional and legislative history of making payments to
Aboriginal people for the use of their land. It then moves to examine
financial components of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory)
Act 1976 and to evaluate the efficacy of their operation. The paper ends by
asking how economic lessons from die Northern Territory might have been
incorporated into the Native Title Act 1993 and examining two mining
agreements completed in the post-Mabo era.
To begin, though, some caveats. There are a very wide range of interests
involved in land rights issues, not just the simplified spectrum, indigenous
to business, with government mediating between them, but a spectrum
within each of these, and between different levels of government. A
healthy diversity of views and positions is evident in all policy processes,
but it is probably highlighted in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
affairs because of its high profile, because it is an arena for open
disputation between the Commonwealth and the States and because it is a
policy area that is loaded with symbolism. This presentation is not entirely
sympathetic to theoretical economic models because two of the key
ingredients in Aboriginal affairs policy formulation, historical precedent
and political reality, are often missing from such models, yet these two
elements are central to the overall argument presented. Land rights and
native title issues are extremely complex to analyse and there are some
simplifications in this paper: it intentionallyfocuses on broader economic
issues that emanate from land rights, and, potentially, from native title
legislation.
Historical antecedents
The introduction of land rights law in the Northern Territory was the
product of progressive social policy of the Whitlam Labor Government,
1972-75; this period marked the start of the modem era in Aboriginal
affairs. Federal intervention was limited to the Northern Territory primarily
because at that time the Territory was administered from Canberra. The
Northern Territory land rights legislation contained important financial
provisions to facilitate Aboriginal economic development. These
provisions were largely a legacy of decisions made in the early years of
Commonwealth administration of the Northern Territory to restrict miners'
access to Aboriginal reserves under the broad colonial policy ambit of
protection and preservation. From 1911, an unusual political economy of
reserved land, and associated controls over commercial development, and
especially mineral exploration of these reserves, existed. At the outset, the
Commonwealth moved to reserve considerable tracts of land for
Aboriginal people under Crown Land Ordinances. The Aboriginals
Ordinance 1918 limited access of non-Aboriginal people onto declared
reserves. And Mining Ordinances also denied the holders of miners' rights
access to Aboriginal reserves; prospecting was forbidden. During the
period 1911 to 1952 this restrictive regime held sway, with very few
exceptions (Altman 1983).
It was only in 1952, in the very different assimilationist policy
environment, that restrictions on mining appeared likely to be lifted after
the discovery of bauxite in the Wessell Islands and a perceived strategic
need for this mineral in the immediate post-war period. The Minister for
Territories at the time instituted a process whereby Aboriginal people
could benefit financially from any mining that occurred on reserves. The
discourse of that time focused on regional economic development, rather
than on cultural or social issues: the then Minister, Paul Hasluck was
adamant that the Administrator, who could now issue miners' rights for
reserves, would only do so in circumstances where significant and strategic
resources were discovered. If mining went ahead on reserves Aboriginal
people were to be compensated, presumably for loss of land.
The Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund (initially the Aborigines (Benefits
from Mining) Trust Fund) established under new provisions in the federal
Northern Territory (Administration) Amendment Act 1952 introduced
policies that continue to exist, in modified form, some 42 years later. First,
the new provisions allowed for returns from mining on reserves to be
earmarked for the use of Aboriginal people irrespective of the absence of
statutory or common law recognition of Aboriginal land ownership;
Aboriginal people neither owned the land nor the minerals. Second,
amendment of the Mining Ordinance 1939-52 resulted in the levying of a
double royalty of 2.5 per cent ad valorem (of the value of minerals
extracted) if mining occurred on Aboriginal reserves. It is important to
note, though, that no administrative or statutory mechanism was
established until the early 1970s to ensure that those who directly bore
economic (and other social and cultural) costs associated with mining
actually received a share of royalty payments or that such payments were
linked to costs incurred. Under these provisions mining companies were
penalised for mining on reserves, a disincentive that the Minister for
Territories intentionally wanted to establish to discourage small-scale and
piecemeal development.
Policy aims do not necessarily match policy practice. Mining did not
eventuate in 1952, but began on Groote Eylandt in 1965. Manganese
deposits were discovered on the island and the Church Missionary Society
(CMS) took out prospecting rights on behalf of Aboriginal residents of the
reserve. Subsequently, Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (BHP)
successfully negotiated with CMS to give up its prospecting rights in
exchange for a negotiated royalty: BHP was willing not only to pay the
double royalty of 2.5 per cent ad valorem, but also an additional 1.25 per
cent. At Gove, on the other hand, the North Australian Bauxite and
Alumina Company Ltd (Nabalco) was unwilling to pay the statutory
double royalty to mine a massive bauxite deposit, but Commonwealth
desire for the mine resulted in the passage of the special Mining (Gove
Peninsula Nabalco Agreement) Ordinance 1968 which incorporated an
output-based statutory royalty that only converted to about 1 per cent ad
valorem. The passage of this ordinance resulted in the unsuccessful attempt
by Yirrkala Aborigines to halt mining in the case Milirrpum and Others
versus Nabalco and the Commonwealth before the Northern Territory
Supreme Court.
Financial aspects of land rights legislation
A central paradox of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
1976 is that it is financed from mining activity on Aboriginal land. This is
an aspect of the legislation that is poorly understood. In 1977, with the
passage of the Act, former reserves were transferred to Aboriginal
ownership. The expansion of the Aboriginal land base via the claims
process has been largely funded from what are generally termed today
'mining royalty equivalents'. This clumsy term came into common usage
when it became more widely recognised that Aboriginal people did not
receive mining royalties as generally perceived, but received their
equivalents paid from consolidated revenue (Altman 1983: 48). This
change occurred because financial provisions of the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 were enacted at the same time as the
Northern Territory became self-governing. Consequently, mineral rights
(and associated royalty rights) for all minerals, except uranium, were
vested with the Northern Territory.
The operations of the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account (ABTA), the
institutional mechanism created to both distribute and accumulate mining
royalty equivalents, are complicated. There are two broad types of minerals
in the Northern Territory resulting from different ownership regimes:
uranium and non-uranium. The ownership of the former is vested in the
Crown in the right of the Commonwealth; ownership of the latter is vested
in the Crown in the right of the Northern Territory. To simplify the
analysis somewhat the concentration here is on the payment to the ABTA
of what are termed 'statutory royalty equivalents', that is the equivalents of
royalties stipulated in statute. This is a simplification because even these
royalties can have a negotiated component. The income of the ABTA
comes from these royalty equivalents and from investment income earned
on accumulated funds. All non-investment income of the ABTA comes
from consolidated revenue and while from the ABTA's perspective there is
no difference between uranium and non-uranium royalty equivalents, from
the Commonwealth's perspective there is one major difference: as uranium
royalties are paid to the Commonwealth their transfer to the Northern
Territory merely represents income foregone. Non-uranium royalties,
however, represent a greater net cost to consolidated revenue as the
Commonwealth has to pay the equivalent of royalties that it does not
receive.
The total income of the ABTA from 1978-79 to 1992-93 is documented in
nominal dollars in Table 1. There are no especially pertinent features of the
income variable except that there was a revenue decline in the late 1980s
from 1985-86 to 1989-90 and again in 1992-93. Total income of the ABTA
to 30 June 1993 is in the region of $296 million. This has been paid with
respect to statutory royalties from the following mines on Aboriginal land:
Gemco on Groote Eylandt, Nabalco at Gove, the Energy Resources of
Australia (ERA) Ranger uranium mine at Jabiru, the Queensland Mines
uranium mine at Nabarlek, the Magellan oil and gas projects at Mereenie
and Palm Valley, and the North Flinders Mines and Henry and Walker
gold mines at the Granites and Tanami. Since legislative amendment in
1990, the ABTA receives equivalents of all statutory royalties raised on
Aboriginal land. The one exception remains the ERA case; the ABTA
receives 77 per cent of the royalty of 5.25 per cent ad valorem levied on
ERA; the remainder is paid by the Commonwealth to the Northern
Territory Government 'in lieu of royalties it does not receive with respect
to uranium, a mineral that it does not own.
The total income, expenditure and accumulated assets of the ABTA are
presented in Table 1. Total income refers to both royalty equivalents and
investment income. Interestingly, all payments from royalty equivalents
made out of the ABTA attract mining withholding tax (currently 5.8 per
cent). However, this tax does not apply to the non-royalty equivalent
income (that is, investment income) of the ABTA.
Table 1. ABTA income and expenditure, 1978-79 to 1992-93.3
Year
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
Total
Total income
($ million)
2.2
2.5
4.4
6.2
18.3
18.2
19.7
23.6
23.3
21.9
21.7
37.7
37.2
37.5
21.3
295.7
Totalexpenditure
($ million)
3.2
3.1
3.7
6.4
13.3
14.2
18.7
18.9
15.9
21.9
26.2
28.5
33.3
37.3
31.4
276.0
Balance at 30 June
($ million)
2.4
1.7
2.4
2.1
7.1
11.0
12.0
16.7
23.3
23.4
18.9
28.0
33.5
33.7
23.6
-
a. Data do not always add up due to rounding error, other expenditure, taxation, etc.
Sources: ABTA Annual Reports 1987-88 to 1992-93; Altman (1983); Altman and Dillon (1988).
Payments out of the ABTA are of two broad types (to simplify again),
discretionary and non-discretionary. In making non-discretionary
payments, the ABTA primarily acts as a clearing house; discretionary
payments are made on the recommendations of an all-Aboriginal Advisory
Committee and the approval of the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs or his delegate.
The payments out of the ABTA, documented in Table 2 are mainly of three
broad types defined under ss.64(l) and 64(7), s.64(3) and s.64(4) of the
legislation.2 These accounted for $272 million, or 93 per cent of the
ABTA's income, in the period 1978-79 to 1992-93. Most of the balance has
been saved, although some has also been spent to meet the administrative
expenses of the ABTA under s.64(5).
Table 2. ABTA major expenditure categories, 1978-79 to 1992-93.3
Major expenditure categories
Year Land councils expenses Areas affected moneys General grants to NT
ss.64(l) and 64(7) s.64(3) s.64(4)
($ million) ($ million) ($ million)
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
Total
0.5
1.4
2.0
3.8
7.4
7.1
8.6
8.7
8.7
11.9
12.2
14.9
14.3
17.8
16.1
135.4
0.3
0.6
1.2
1.7
5.3
5.1
5.2
6.7
6.0
5.6
5.6
8.4
10.7
11.4
5.6
79.4
2.5
1.1
0.5
0.9
0.7
2.0
4.9
3.5
1.1
4.1
8.1
2.5
8.2
7.9
9.5
57.4
a. Data do not always add up due to rounding error, other expenditure, taxation,etc.
Sources: ABTA Annual Reports 1987-88 to 1992-93; Alunan (1983); Alunan and Dillon (1988).
The least discretionary payments are those to incorporated groups whose
members are traditional owners of, or residents in, areas affected by
mining, although the geographic jurisdictions of such areas have never
been precisely defined. It is land councils who determine, under s.35(2)
how these moneys will be divided between regional incorporated groups,
often termed 'royalty associations'. These payments under s.64(3) account
for 30 per cent of the royalty equivalents received with respect to any
particular resource development project. For example, the Gagudju
Association receives 30 per cent of the statutory equivalent payments made
by ERA with respect to the Ranger uranium mine to the ABTA. Over the
period 1978-79 to 1992-93, $79 million, or 27 per cent of ABTA income,
was paid to incorporated groups in areas affected via land councils.
Payments to land councils to meet their operational expenses are also
largely non-discretionary. Land councils are statutory authorities
established by Commonwealth law with legally specified functions. This is
not to say that they are not very unusual statutory authorities, primarily
because they are openly, and at times extremely, political (Altman and
Dillon 1988). Their budgets are submitted for approval to the Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs. Under s.64(l), only 40 per
cent of ABTA royalty equivalent income is earmarked for land council
operational costs, but if approved budgets exceed this amount, additional
resources can be made available under s.64(7). Conversely, if s.64(l)
payments exceed approved budgets, these 'surpluses' must be distributed.
During the period 1978-79 to 1992-93, land councils received $135 million
to meet their operational expenses. This amount accounted for 46 per cent
of ABTA income; while the costs of land councils has been politically
contentious, it has also been argued that these costs could have been
limited to s.64(l) payments without the impost of the incongruous mining
withholding tax (Altman 1985; Australian National Audit Office 1993).
Payments made under s.64(4) as grants to be used to, or for, the benefit of
Aboriginal people residing in the Northern Territory are discretionary,
being based primarily on the recommendations of an all-Aboriginal
Advisory Committee. While Mr Justice Woodward (1974) recommended
that these payments should account for 30 per cent of the ABTA's receipts,
over the period 1978-79 to 1992-93 they have totalled $57 million, or 19
per cent of the ABTA's total income. These payments are arguably
intended to compensate Aboriginal people who do not own land in the
Northern Territory, but since a review of the ABTA in 1989 (Crough
1989b), a high proportion of these moneys have been used to purchase
pastoral stations that have then become eligible for land claim under s.50
of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976.
Evaluating financial aspects of Northern Territory land rights
Evaluating financial aspects of land rights legislation is open to variable
interpretation, depending on one's standpoint. The analysis here focuses on
two broad sets of issues. The first set focuses narrowly and directly on
financial aspects from an Aboriginal perspective by examining utilisation
of ss.64(l) and 64(7), 64(3) and 64(4) moneys. The second set focus on
three wider financial aspects for both indigenous and non-indigenous
interests: the costs of the claims process; delays in processing exploration
licence applications; and associated incentives provided to traditional
owners to allow mining on their land.
Whether the $135 million paid to the Northern Territory land councils to
claim and manage Aboriginal land has been optimally spent is a complex
question. Land councils, like all statutory bureaucracies, can be of variable
efficiency (see Australian National Audit Office 1993 with respect to the
Northern Land Council) and given their wider political activities they will
always seek to maximise their ministerially-approved budgets. Whatever
the cost, there is little doubt that the transfer of land to indigenous interests
via the claims process is a redistribution of a key factor endowment that
has the potential to be of future economic significance. In 1977, 258,000
square kilometres of then existing reserves were scheduled in the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 and transferred to
inalienable Aboriginal title. This represented 19 per cent of the Northern
Territory land base. By March 1994, the Aboriginal land base had doubled
to 520,000 square kilometres or 39 per cent of the Northern Territory:
some of this expansion occurred owing to negotiated Northern Territory
title to land (11,000 square kilometres) and additional scheduled land
(6,000 square kilometres). But the vast majority of the expansion was due
to successful claims which expanded the Aboriginal land base by 245,000
square kilometres, almost all of which was unalienated Crown land. It is
estimated that once the claims process is completed (new claims cannot be
lodged after 1997) Aboriginal land could cover 49 per cent of the State.
The utilisation of moneys paid to areas affected has never been rigorously
assessed. There is evidence that in some situations impressive and strategic
regional developments have occurred, most notably at Kakadu National
Park via the Gagudju Association (Altman 1983; O'Faircheallaigh 1986),
but also in central Australia via the Ngurratjuta Association (Marshall
1994). There is also evidence of some notable failures, in terms of regional
economic development, as with the Kunwinjku Association in Western
Arnhem Land (O'Faircheallaigh 1988; Altman and Smith 1994). There is
some discretion possible in the allocation of areas affected moneys, but an
evident reluctance by the Commonwealth and land councils to closely
scrutinise the operations of so-called 'royalty' associations (all also receive
additional income from non-royalty based agreement and rental payments).
Some consideration needs to be given to defining 'affectedness' and to
specifying how mining moneys should be utilised to ameliorate negative
impacts of resource development projects if they occur.
It is the granting operations of the ABTA, the most discretionary residual
that has been most closely monitored, primarily because the ABTA has
been institutionally located within the Aboriginal affairs bureaucracy and
has been very accessible to scrutiny. It has been commented on and
reviewed on a number of occasions (Toohey 1984; Altman 1985; Crough
1989a, 1989b; Walter and Tumbull 1993) and each time it has been
criticised primarily for lacking appropriate financial and expenditure
policies, but also for making grants in contravention of its own policies.
Blame has invariably been laid with the ABTA Advisory Committee or its
sub-committee, but rarely with the Commonwealth Minister or his
delegate. A key criticism made of the ABTA as a Trust Account, especially
by the Australian National Audit Office, is that it has a poor savings and
investment performance: its accumulated reserves at 30 June 1993 only
totalled $24 million or 7 per cent of income. However, there is no statutory
requirement for the ABTA to save; indeed Woodward's (1974)
recommended 40/30/30 formula merely treated the ABTA as a royalties
clearing house.
The fact that the ABTA only retains income after the payment of non-
discretionary areas affected moneys and land council administration
expenses (including supplementary funding) has not only marginalised its
operations, but has also placed it in an unfortunate adversarial relationship
with land councils as supplementary funding of land councils directly
impinges on resources available to the ABTA Advisory Committee for
granting purposes. The ABTA is in an invidious position: when it
responsibly purchases pastoral stations for Aboriginal interests it is
criticised for providing a means under the Land Rights Act to convert these
stations to inalienable Aboriginal freehold title. When it responds to
Aboriginal priorities, like the funding of transport, it is criticised for
irresponsible expenditure. One of the continual tensions that has influenced
the ABTA's granting operations is that between the policy of self-
determination, which emphasises that granting activity should be according
to Aboriginal prerogatives and which has resulted in high expenditure, and
the economic rationality of accumulation. In 1984 it was recommended
that the ABTA should become a peak organisation that operated as an
independent statutory authority to manage financial aspects of the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Altman 1985: 26-
9); this recommendation was never implemented. In 1994, ten years later,
the ABTA, which remains under closer ministerial control than the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) itself, is
looking increasingly anachronistic.
From a wider perspective, the costs of the claims process has been
substantial and has been largely borne by the Commonwealth: land council
costs have been met from royalty equivalents, the costs of the Aboriginal
Land Commissioner by the Aboriginal affairs budget, and the costs of the
Northern Territory Government (opposing claims, testing traditional
evidence, appealing to Federal or High Courts or merely appearing at
hearings) largely from 'land rights factors' adjustments made by the
Commonwealth Grants Commission. A cost that the Commonwealth has
not had to consider to date is 'just terms' compensation to the Northern
Territory Government for the transfer of land to Aboriginal ownership, a
possibility that has been recently raised.3
An inefficiency that has become increasingly apparent in the Northern
Territory is the unworkability of mining provisions, particularly in relation
to the processing of exploration licences. Such delays can come under the
short-hand rubric of 'transactions costs'. These have been borne in part by
mining companies and in part by Aboriginal traditional owners who may
wish exploration (and mining) activity to proceed. The reasons for the slow
processing of exploration licences include legal disputes over the operation
of the veto, in particular whether conjunctive (that is exploration and
mining) or disjunctive (that is separate negotiation at exploration and
mining stages) agreements are appropriate. While the Northern Territory
Supreme Court ruled in the Stockdale decision of March 1992 that
disjunctive agreements are not permitted under the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976, such agreements would appear extremely
suitable to expedite exploration, and then, sequentially, mining.4 There has
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also been a continual inability by all parties to meet timetables stipulated in
amendments to the Land Rights Act in 1987 (Pinney 1993). While at times,
resulting transactions costs can be strategically turned to transactions gains
if depressed prices for minerals increase over time, this is obviously an
area in the operation of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory)
Act 1976 that requires further streamlining. Exploration licence processing
needs to be more effective; the resolution of this problem requires a degree
of Commonwealth political will that has not been evident to date.
An associated issue is related to the clarity of property rights in minerals on
Aboriginal land. There is a view expressed by both the mining industry and
the Industry Commission (1991) that traditional owners of Aboriginal land
face a distorted incentive structure and are subsequently unnecessarily anti-
development because they are only guaranteed a maximum 30 per cent of
royalties (aside from additional negotiated deals allowed under ss.43 or
44). On one hand, it could be argued that this should provide a sufficient
incentive given that traditional owners have not been vested with a legal
mineral right. On the other hand, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 requires that s.64(3) payments are not just reserved for
traditional owners (irrespective of place of residence), but that they are
shared with other Aborigines residing in areas affected (irrespective of
their land ownership status). There is enormous discretion in the
distribution of such areas affected moneys. For example, between 1982 and
1988 such moneys paid with respect to the Nabarlek uranium mine were
shared between the 1,200 plus members of the Kunwinjku Association.
Between 1988 and the present, payment of moneys from the same mine
have been limited to the less than 100 members of the Nabarlek Traditional
Owners Association (Altman and Smith 1994).
The above analysis indicates that there are elements of the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 that are not working and that require
rectification. There are problems inherent in some of the incentive
structures established by the statute most of which will require legislative
amendments, and an associated political commitment to develop workable
policy. One of the lessons that can be learnt from the Northern Territory is
that the legislation can be working sub-optimally, or badly, but required
statutory amendment or changes in administrative practice will not
automatically occur. This can be due to lack of imaginative and transparent
policy-making, but it can also be due to an absence of obvious solutions to
complex problems. The bottom line is that legislative change requires a
conjunction of appropriate policy and the political incentives to all
interested parties to proceed to resolutions.
A radical recasting of the financial provisions of the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 is needed. Options that have been
raised, but rarely seriously considered, have included: funding of land
councils directly from consolidated revenue; establishing the ABTA as an
11
overriding statutory authority that manages all financial resources raised
from commercial activity on Aboriginal land, but also has statutory
functions to develop that land; specifying the role of 'areas affected
moneys' in statute; specifying, again in statute, the means to accumulate
development capital if this is regarded as a priority; and the abolition of
s.64(4) grants if these are regarded as duplicating either the granting
activities of ATSIC or the land claims activities of land councils.
Land rights lessons and native title5
It has been argued elsewhere in some detail that many of the problems
evident in the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 have
been addressed by different provisions and institutional arrangements in
the Native Title Act 1993 (Altman 1993, 1994). The focus here is limited to
two issues highlighted above: transactions costs and property rights. While
there are no empirical examples yet of resource development projects
negotiated under the Native Title Act 1993, two mining agreements
alluding to native title 'principles' completed after the Mabo High Court
judgment of July 1992 will be briefly discussed.
The Native Title Act 1993 provides native title holders with no veto over
mineral exploration activity and no royalty rights. As noted above, from
the indigenous perspective the absence of the veto and no nexus with
statutory royalties are the weakest financial elements of the legislation.
Under the broad ambit of racial equality, indigenous Australians are
provided similar negotiation and appeal rights with respect to exploration
available to other land owners in Australia, with the exception that any
disagreements will be resolved before a tribunal. Aware of mining industry
criticism of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, the
Commonwealth has provided institutional arrangements that will minimise
delays in making claims for native title, negotiating for the use of such land
by developers and for assessing compensation. For example, maximum
time frames are stipulated in the legislation to reach agreements (four
months for exploration, six months for mining; and then, the same periods
again if disagreement requires a tribunal determination). There is a heavy
emphasis on 'alternative dispute resolution' and associated attempts to
avoid costly appeals litigation in the Federal Court and options for informal
arrangements between parties that can be formalised in agreements. There
are also so-called 'expedited' procedures that will quicken negotiations
(maximum of two months), national interest and other override provisions,
and the potential to undertake 'low impact future acts' if native title is not
yet determined.6
An innovative mechanism in the Native Title Act 1993 is proposed
negotiation procedures with respect to future acts on native title land.
Because Crown ownership of minerals is maintained, s.38(2) emphasises
that the value of minerals cannot be taken into account by an arbitral body
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in determining compensation in marked contrast to provisions in the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. However, the
Native Title Act 1993 encourages miners and native title holders to come to
an agreement prior to arbitration without any restrictions on financial
provisions of such agreements. The signal here to miners is to expedite
proceedings by making reasonable, even generous, offers to native title
holders; the signal to native title holders is not to use the right of
negotiation as a de facto right of veto because an arbitral body will, in all
likelihood, offer less compensation than might be negotiated direct with
mining companies. An incentive structure is established to encourage all
parties to settle 'out of court'. Whether this occurs will depend on many
factors, including the need to hasten mineral extraction, the type of mine
and the size and financial resources of mining companies.
A minimisation of transactions costs will only occur with a degree of
goodwill from all parties, including governments. The fact that negotiation
will need to occur with corporate land-holding groups is potentially
problematic, because there is always room for intra-group disagreement.
On the other hand, given the High Court judgment, mechanisms have been
established to facilitate negotiation and the system is to be funded largely
by the Commonwealth: one only needs to consider the enormous financial
costs that would eventuate, for both private sector interests and Australian
taxpayers, in the absence of such statutory structures if all disputes
ultimately needed to be adjudicated by the High Court.
There are already indications, evident in two very different agreements at
Mt Todd and McArthur River, that where mining companies and
indigenous interests are willing to negotiate, with governments mediating,
positive outcomes for all parties can occur. While neither agreement was
conducted under the Native Title Act 1993, indeed the Mt Todd Agreement
was completed in January 1993, both are instructive because they were
conducted in a political environment heavily influenced by the Mabo
judgment and the Mt Todd agreement is especially important because it, in
turn, appears to have influenced the drafting of the Native Title Act 1993.
The Mt Todd Agreement is a deed signed by the Northern Territory
Government, a gold mining company Zapopan NL and the Jawoyn
Association. The basis of the Agreement was a repeat claim (after the
failure of an earlier claim) under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 by the Jawoyn to an area known as Northern Territory
portion 3469 and Jawoyn assertion of common law 'native title' to this
same area. In exchange for Northern Territory title to this land (without
any veto right), important financial and territorial concessions by the
Northern Territory Government and a mining agreement with Zapopan, the
Jawoyn agreed to withdraw the repeat claim and to surrender and
extinguish any native title. Economic and land benefits from the
Agreement to Jawoyn include Northern Territory Government request for
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Commonwealth scheduling of additional land under the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, a commitment to the development of
Werenbun outstation, financial assistance with the development of tourism
facilities at Eva Valley and increased annual rentals for Nitmiluk National
Park (owned by Jawoyn). Zapopan has guaranteed employment
opportunities, a bus service contract and education scholarships to the
Jawoyn. A direct spinoff of the Mt Todd Agreement has been the
establishment of the Mirrkworlk joint venture between the Henry and
Walker Group (50 per cent), the ATSIC Commercial Development
Corporation (25 per cent) and the Jawoyn Association (25 per cent).
Mirrkworlk won the major tender to mine and transport 10 million cubic
metres of ore and waste over a three-year period to the Zapopan mill.
There are options for a third of the Mirrkworlk workforce to be Jawoyn
(currently 25 per cent) and the Jawoyn Association has the option to buy
out the Commercial Development Corporation share of the company.
More recently, in March 1994, a less favourable agreement was signed
between the Commonwealth, the Northern Land Council (on behalf of
Gurdanji, Yanyuwa and Mara people) and the Gurdanji-Bingbinga
Corporation that will provide economic opportunities for Aboriginal
people in the McArthur River region in exchange for the granting and
validation of certain mining interests to Mt Isa Mines. In this agreement,
local Aboriginal people accepted a package, funded almost exclusively by
the Commonwealth, in exchange for unhampered go-ahead for the
McArthur River mining project. Benefits to local Aboriginal people
include the purchase for them of Bauhinia Downs pastoral station, a
significant employment and training package to facilitate local
employment in the mine and a financial package from ATSIC to develop
the pastoral enterprise. As at Mt Todd, a joint venture company,
Carpenteria Shipping Services, has been set up between the Commercial
Development Corporation, Burns Philp and the Gurdanji-Bingbinga
Corporation. McArthur River Mines awarded the contract to barge silver,
zinc and lead concentrates over a ten-year period to Carpenteria. There are
options for up to 50 per cent of the company workforce to be Aboriginal
and guaranteed training opportunities with Burns Philp.
These two agreements have been quite different with the McArthur River
agreement being somewhat more contentious, partly owing to diverse
regional Aboriginal views, with more prolonged negotiation than at Mt
Todd. The McArthur River Agreement is also inferior because neither the
Northern Territory Government nor the mining company, Mt Isa Mines,
are signatories; indeed delays in the agreement resulted in lost
opportunities that were to be financed by both. Furthermore, local people
have not withdrawn native title claims to offshore islands. In these two
agreements positive outcomes have resulted for miners and Aboriginal
interests, with limited net cost to government. The economic impact of
both agreements for Aboriginal people and mining companies will require
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future assessment: certainly there are early indications that it might prove
cost-effective for mining companies to recruit staff locally and to let
contracts to competitive joint venturers with Commercial Development
Corporation and regional Aboriginal equity.
Aboriginal interests appear to be increasingly recognising that land alone
will not result in regional economic development: capital and human
capital is also needed. A new form of joint venture with indigenous equity
participation, employment and training opportunities and buy-back options
is evolving. Ultimately it appears that when both parties are willing to
move from confrontation to consultation to negotiation, positive outcomes
will eventuate. Importantly, the absence of automatic royalty-equivalent
payments under both agreements and the Native Title Act 1993 framework
appears to be encouraging a more active Aboriginal involvement in
resource development projects. There is also a growing Aboriginal
recognition that the payment of royalty equivalents to incorporated bodies
in areas affected by mining will often result in excessive regional
politicking for these mining moneys, with a concomitant lack of attention
to longer-term economic opportunities and an inability to accumulate
venture capital for investment.
Native title: some wider implementation issues
In implementing native title legislation, there are lessons to be learnt from
the Northern Territory experience. An important part of the Native Title
Act 1993 that itself may have limited relevance in the Northern Territory is
the establishment of a National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land
Fund that will be used to purchase land for those whose native title has
been totally extinguished; pastoral lands purchased will be convertible to
native title in much the same way as Aboriginal-owned stations in the
Northern Territory can be claimed under s.50 of the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 7976.7The operations of the ABTA in
particular (but also ATSIC's land acquisition program recently reviewed by
the Office of Evaluation and Audit 1992) will be of interest here. In
particular, there are indications that the ABTA has had enormous difficulty
in accumulating sufficient reserves to establish a sustainable capital base. If
accumulation is an objective then it will be necessary to incorporate a
savings ratio in statute as was recommended for the ABTA in 1984
(Altman 1985) and as occurred after amendment to the New South Wales
Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 in 1986.
The pressure to purchase land will remain a priority now that the National
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund is established, but
consideration has to be given to the resources needed to develop the land,
an issue highlighted by ATSIC's Office of Evaluation and Audit and one
that has also hampered the ABTA when it has purchased pastoral
properties. There may be merit in the Commonwealth separately
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earmarking resources for land purchases and adequate resources for land
development in its social justice package. The ATSIC Commercial
Development Corporation provides an appropriate conduit to facilitate
commercial joint ventures on land owned by indigenous Australians.
Quarantining of resources could provide the means to finance indigenous
equity stakes in development.8 The fact that the two post-Mabo mining
agreements at Mt Todd and McArthur River do not include even partial
royalty equivalent payments to Aboriginal people suggests that active
Aboriginal participation in resource development projects (as joint
venturers, employees or contractors) might supersede a more passive
'rentier' role evident in all mining agreements signed since passage of the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. A key difference in
recent joint ventures is that Aboriginal interests hold significant equity
stakes and matching representation on boards of management.
It has been suggested above that the Native Title Act 1993 provides a
conducive institutional framework to facilitate negotiations between
mining interests and native title holders. At times, a view is expressed that
delays in negotiations will result in an economic cost to governments, in
terms of jobs and revenue forgone, if minerals remain unexploited (Centre
for International Economics 1993). This argument is not persuasive: from
the governmental perspective, minerals left in the ground are not
necessarily forgone. Indeed, risk associated with unwillingness to negotiate
is greatest for mining and indigenous interests. Continual delays in
exploration and mining will result in losses for mining companies. The
political risk for indigenous interests is that an unwillingness to negotiate
will see the loss of the exploration veto right (stipulated in the Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976) or the loss of negotiation rights
(currently guaranteed by the Native Title Act 1993). There is a need to
carefully balance veto or negotiation rights as commercial leverage with
wider perceptions of potential transactions and associated costs.
Conclusion
In a paper titled 'Economic implications of native title: dead end or way
forward?' (Altman 1994), it was suggested that we will not see an
automatic economic takeoff of the indigenous sector Australia-wide
because of native title legislation. Land alone has a limited ability to
guarantee economic development: capital accumulation and
entrepreneurial expertise will also be needed to allow the development of
the indigenous land base. In this paper, in a specific regional context, it is
argued that leverage opportunities provided by the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976, and now the Native Title Act 1993, have the
capacity to create regional development options for Aboriginal people.
Such views have been expressed in the past. But the fundamental difference
in the mid-1990s is that some economic lessons, from both past failures
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and successes have been absorbed. It is increasingly recognised by
Aboriginal interests that the payment of mining royalty equivalents alone
will not guarantee economic development or longer-term economic benefit.
The critical path to economic gain will occur via active indigenous
participation, as significant stakeholders, in resource development. To a
great extent, the Native Title Act 1993 with its absence of a direct nexus
with statutory royalties, provides a strong signal to take such a route.
Equity participation in resource development projects might not only
provide the means to dismiss the negative stereotype that indigenous
people are anti-development, but it might also demonstrate that given real
opportunities for participation, indigenous people will be pro-development.
The policy implications to government of this option are that appropriate
mechanisms are needed to allow maximum capital accumulation for
investment and to facilitate commercial joint ventures on land owned,
either by statute or in common law, by indigenous Australians.
Notes
1. The term Aboriginal is used here in the Northern Territory context, rather than the
terms indigenous or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, because most of the
issues raised relate specifically to Aboriginal Australians.
2. For definitions of sections of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
1976 and other technical terms see the glossary below.
3. This possibility is being raised in part in the case Newcrest Mining (WA) Limited
versus the Commonwealth (on appeal from the Federal Court) seeking
compensation from the Commonwealth in relation to the ban on mining at
Coronation Hill. More recently, on 9 May 1994, the Northern Territory
Government lodged a writ in the High Court challenging the constitutional
validity of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 ('Perron
takes land veto battle to High Court1, The Australian, 9 May 1994).
4. This is a complex issue. From the Aboriginal perspective, disjunctive agreements
are preferable because they provide greater negotiation leverage at the mining
stage. From the miners' perspective, conjunctive agreements are preferable
because once successful exploration has been financed, it is unacceptable for
mining go-ahead to be denied.
5. If the appeal (Janice Pareroultja and others versus Robert Tickner, Kumanara
Breadon and Max Stuart) before the High Court on 13 April 1994 had been
successful, the Native Title Act 1993 might have overruled the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 in whole or in part. The High Court,
however, refused to consider the appeal.
6. The Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs has
the capacity to exclude certain types of exploration from the right to negotiate.
This would allow State and Territory Governments to grant 'low impact'
exploration rights to mining companies. To date, no arrangements have been
announced with any State or Territory, and Western Australia has responded
negatively to Commonwealth overtures to consider this option.
7. In debate in the Senate on 16 December 1993, Senator Evans indicated in
response to a question from Senator Tambling that the National Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Land Fund would not be used to purchase pastoral stations
in the Northern Territory that could then be converted to inalienable title under
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the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976. However, the Fund
could be used to purchase stations that could be converted to native title. The
difference will be that the right of veto exists under inalienable title, but not under
native title.
8. Noel Pearson, Director, Cape York Land Council made a case, at a recent
Australian Petroleum Association Conference, for the establishment of an equity
bank to facilitate Aboriginal access to capital for joint ventures with resource
companies wanting to explore and mine on Aboriginal land (see 'Equity bank
answer for Aborigines', The Australian, 23 March 1994).
Glossary of terms used in the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
ABTF: The Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund, established in 1952. Operated from 1969-1978.
Made grants and loans to Aboriginal organisations and individuals. Controlled by the Welfare
Branch of the Northern Territory Administration.
ABTA: The Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account. Established in 1977, started operating from 1
July 1978, inheriting the assets and liabilities (including policies and practices) of the ABTF.
Primarily a clearing house of royaltyequivalents.
Royalty equivalents: Payments made from consolidated revenue equivalent to royalties raised
on Aboriginal land. Up until January 1990 royalty equivalents were not really equivalents
because of a difference between Northern Territory and pre-self government (Mining
Ordinance) royalty regimes. This anomaly has now been removed, except in the case of
uranium.
S.64(l) payments: Payments made by the ABTA to Aboriginal land councils, statutory bodies
with specified functions. Land councils receive a minimum 40 per cent of mining royalty
equivalent receipts of the ABTA. Their budgets are approved by the federal Minister for
Aboriginal Affairs. From 1979-80 to 1992-93, the approved budgets of land councils regularly
exceeded amounts available under s.64(l) and supplementary payments under s.64(7) were
needed. There are currently four land councils, the Northern, Central, Tiwi and Anindilyakwa
Land Councils that receive a minimum 22 per cent, 15 per cent, 2 per cent and 1 per cent of
ABTA royalty equivalent receipts respectively.
S.64(3) payments: Often referred to as areas affected moneys. Thirty per cent of royalty
equivalent receipts of the ABTA paid with respect to any particular resource development
project are paid to the land council in whose jurisdiction the project is being undertaken. Under
s.35(2) of the Act, these moneys have to be paid, within six months, to Aboriginal Councils
whose areas are either in whole or in part in (undefined) areas affected; or to any incorporated
Aboriginal Association the members of which live in (but need not be traditional owners of) or
are traditional owners of (but need not live in) areas affected (su'll undefined).
S.64(4) grants: Amounts paid out of the ABTA to be used to or for the benefit of Aboriginal
people living in the Northern Territory. The amounts to be paid out of the ABTA under this
section are determined by the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs and are
totally discretionary. Purposes for which they are to be applied are recommended by an
Aboriginal Advisory Committee and approved by the Minister or his delegate (currently the
Northern Territory 'State' manager of ATSIC). Mr Justice Woodward recommended that these
grants account for 30 per cent of the ABTA's royalty (now equivalent) receipts, but such a
formula was never included in the Act.
References
Altman, J.C. 1983. Aborigines and Mining Royalties in the Northern Territory, Australian
Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra.
Altman, J.C. 1985. Report on the Review of the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account (and Related
Financial Matters) in the Northern Territory Land Rights Legislation, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
18
Altman, J.C. 1993. 'Economic dimensions of the Mabo High Court judgment', Australian
Economic Review, 103 (3rd Quarter): 26-34.
Altman, J.C. 1994. 'Economic implications of native title: dead end or way forward?', in W.
Sanders (ed.) Mabo and Native Title: Origins and Institutional Implications, Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, Canberra.
Altman, J.C. and Dillon, M.C. 1988. 'Aboriginal land rights, land councils and the development
of the Northern Territory', in D. Wade-Marshall and P. Loveday (eds) Northern Australia
Progress and Prospects, Volume  I , Contemporary Issues in Development, North Australia
Research Unit, Darwin.
Altman, J.C. and Smith, D.E. 1994. 'The economic impact of mining moneys: the Nabarlck
case, Western Arnhem Land', CAEPR Discussion Paper 63, Centre for Aboriginal
Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, Canberra.
Australian National Audit Office 1993. Efficiency Audit: Northern Land Council, Audit Report
No. 20,1993-94, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Centre for International Economics 1993. Economic Effects of Land Rights in the Northern
Territory, unpublished report, Centre for International Economics, Canberra.
Crough, G. 1989a. Report on the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account, with Particular Reference
to Future Royalty Equivalent Income, unpublished report prepared for the Department of
Aboriginal Affairs, Economic and Social Policy Unit, University of Sydney, Sydney, July
1989 (revised version).
Crough, G. (Convener) 1989b. Report on the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account, unpublished
report prepared for the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Economic and Social Policy Unit,
University of Sydney, Sydney.
Industry Commission 1991. Mining and Mineral Processing in Australia, Report No. 7,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Marshall, C. 1994. "The impact of royalty payments on Aboriginal communities in the Northern
Territory', in P. Jull, M. Mulrennan, M. Sullivan, G. Crough and D. Lea (eds) Surviving
Columbus: Indigenous Peoples, Political Reform and Environmental Management in North
Australia, North Australia Research Unit, Darwin.
OTaircheallaigh, C. 1986. "The economic impact on Aboriginal communities of the Ranger
Project, 1979-1985', Australian Aboriginal Studies, 1986/2: 2-14.
O'Faircheallaigh, C. 1988. 'Uranium royalties and Aboriginal economic development', in D.
Wade-Marshall and P. Loveday (eds) Northern Australia Progress and Prospects, Volume
1, Contemporary Issues in Development, North Australia Research Unit,Darwin.
Office of Evaluation and Audit (OEA) 1992. Impact Evaluation Land Acquisition Program,
OEA, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Canberra.
Pinney, J. 1993. The Northern Territory land rights experience - model for the nation?',
unpublished paper presented at the conference Mabo: Sovereign Risk or National
Opportunity organised by Australian Investment Conferences, 23-24 August 1993.
Toohey, J. 1984. Seven Years On: Report by Mr Justice Toohey to the Minister for Aboriginal
Affairs on the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 and Related Matters,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Walter and Turnbull 1993. Report on an Internal Audit of the Aboriginals Benefit Trust
Account, unpublished report to the Office of Evaluation and Audit, Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission, Canberra.
Woodward, A.E. 1974. The Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, Second Report, April 1974,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
(CAEPR)
RECENT DISCUSSION PAPERS
25/1992 Patterns and trends in the spatial diffusion of the Torres Strait Islander
population, J. Taylor and W.S. Arthur.
26/1992 Aborigines, tourism and sustainable development, J.C. Altman and
J. Finlayson.
27/1992 Political spoils or political largesse? Regional development in northern
Quebec, Canada and Australia's Northern Territory, C. Scott.
28/1992 Survey or census? Estimation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
housing need in large urban areas, J. Taylor.
29/1992 An analysis of the Aboriginal component of Commonwealth fiscal flows to
the Northern Territory, D.E. Smith.
30/1992 Estimating Northern Territory Government program expenditure for
Aboriginal people: problems and implications, D.E. Smith.
31/1992 Estimating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander fertility from census data,
K.H.W. Gaminiratne.
32/1992 The determinants of Aboriginal employment income, A.E. Daly.
33/1992 Occupational segregation: a comparison between employed Aborigines,
Torres Strait Islanders and other Australians, J. Taylor.
34/1992 Aboriginal population change in remote Australia, 1986-91: data issues,
J. Taylor.
35/1992 A comparison of the socioeconomic characteristics of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people, J. Taylor and K.H. W. Gaminiratne.
36/1992 The CDEP scheme: a census-based analysis of the labour market status of
participants in 1986, J.C. Altman and A.E. Daly.
37/1993 Indigenous Australians in the National Tourism Strategy: impact,
sustainability and policy issues, J.C. Altman.
38/1993 Education and employment for young Aborigines, A.E. Daly.
39/1993 Self-employment amongst Aboriginal people, A.E. Daly.
40/1993 Aboriginal socioeconomic change in the Northern Territory, 1986-91,
J. Taylor.
41/1993 ATSIC's mechanisms for resource allocation: current policy and practice,
D.E. Smith.
42/1993 The fiscal equalisation model: options for ATSIC's future funding policy and
practice, D.E. Smith.
43/1993 The position of older Aboriginal people in the labour market, A.E. Daly.
44/1993 Determining the labour force status of Aboriginal people using a
multinomial logit model, A.E. Daly, B. Allen, L. Aufflick, E. Bosworth and
M. Caruso.
45/1993 Indigenous Australians and the labour market: issues for the union
movement in the 1990s, J.C. Altman and A.E. Hawke.
46/1993 Rethinking the fundamentals of social policy towards indigenous
Australians: block grants, mainstreaming and the multiplicity of agencies
and programs, W. Sanders.
47/1993 Compensating indigenous Australian 'losers': a community-oriented
approach from the Aboriginal social policy arena, J.C. Altman and D.E.
Smith.
48/1993 Work and welfare for indigenous Australians, A.E. Daly and A.E. Hawke.
49/1993 Change in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population distribution,
1986-91, K.H.W. Gaminiratne.
50/1993 Education and employment for young indigenous Australians, 1986 to 1991,
A.E. Daly.
51/1993 Reconciling public accountability and Aboriginal self-determination/self-
management: is ATSIC succeeding?, W. Sanders.
52/1993 Indicative projections of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
population to 2011, A. Gray and K.H.W. Gaminiratne.
53/1993 Employment implications of the growth of the indigenous Australian
working-age population to 2001, J.C. Altman and K.H.W. Gaminiratne.
54/1993 The rise and rise of the CDEP scheme: an Aboriginal 'workfare' program in
times of persistent unemployment, W. Sanders.
55/1994 The relative economic status of indigenous people in New South Wales,
1986-91, J. Taylor and L. Roach.
56/1994 The relative economic status of indigenous people in Tasmania, 1986-91,
J. Taylor and L. Roach.
57/1994 The relative economic status of indigenous people in Victoria, 1986-91,
J. Taylor and L. Roach.
58/1994 The relative economic status of indigenous people in South Australia,
1986-91, J. Taylor and L. Roach.
59/1994 The relative economic status of indigenous people in Western Australia,
1986-91, J. Taylor and L. Roach.
60/1994 The relative economic status of indigenous people in Queensland, 1986-
91, J. Taylor.
61/1994 The relative economic status of indigenous people in the Australian Capital
Territory, 1986-91, J. Taylor.
62/1994 The relative economic status of indigenous people in the Northern Territory,
1986-91, J. Taylor.
63/1994 The economic impact of mining moneys: the Nabarlek case, Western Arnhem
Land, J.C. Altman and D.E. Smith.
64/1994 Implementing native title: economic lessons from the Northern Territory,
J.C. Altman.
For information on earlier CAEPR Discussion Papers contact Nicky Lumb, Centre
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Faculty of Arts, Australian National
University, Canberra ACT 0200. Ph (06) 249 0587 Fax (06) 249 2789.


